Introduction Video

https://www.loom.com/share/ae41a0fa332141338bab439a0c6e10e1

🤿 About mev-tendermint

✅  Design

The design goals of MEV-Tendermint is to allow & preserve:

1. 🔒  Privacy for users submitting bundles
2. 🎁  Atomicity for bundles of transactions
3. 🐎  Priority guaranteed for highest paying bundles
4. 🏛  No new security assumptions for validators and nodes running MEV-Tendermint, including removing the need for ingress or egress for locked-down validators. No new network assumptions are made
5. 🔄  On-chain transaction submission via gossip, no need for off-chain submission like HTTP endpoints, endpoint querying, etc
6. 💨  Impossible to slow down block time, i.e. no part of mev-tendermint introduces consensus delays

🔎  Basic Functionality Overview

🏦  Auction

• Prior to the creation of the first proposal for height n+1 , the Skip Sentinel infrastructure selects an auction-winning bundle (or bundles) to include at the top of block n+1
• The auction-winning bundle is defined as the bundle that pays the highest gas price ( sum(txFee)/sum(gasWanted) ) and doesn’t include any reverting transactions
• The sentinel ensures it’s simulations of the bundle are accurate by simulating it against the version of state where it will actually run (by optimistically applying the proposals produced for height n )

🗣️  Gossip

• Before the first proposal for height n+1 is created, the Skip sentinel gossips the auction-winning bundle(s) to whichever nodes belonging to that proposer it can access (e.g. sentries if the validator is using a sentry configuration, or validator replicas if it’s using horcrux)
• The nodes that receive the winning bundle(s) gossip it to the other nodes belonging to that proposer to ensure the bundle(s) reach the validator